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Overview 
Surprises; but Larger Theme is Understanding
v Accidents can occur when system operators fail to understand system or airplane state
. . . although misunderstandings also happen without accidents
v The design of the system interface, procedures, and training do not always support 
understanding
. . . in fact, they can make it harder
v There is a tension between design and the interests of the operators
. . . largely due to the evolution of system design
v I will offer several ideas for better supporting operator understanding
Making Sense of a Complex World 
Challenges: Complex systems and unfamiliar forces
What are common reasons for surprise?
v Knowledge: Inadequate understanding of systems 
§ Singapore 006
§ Spanair 5022
v False perception: Spatial disorientation
§ Flash Air 604
Let’s look at some missed opportunities to re-frame
Surprise:  PVD did not activate
Response (Capt):  Not on yet er PVD huh
never mind we can see the runway, not so
bad. Ok, I am going to put it to high first. 
Singapore Airlines 006
Taipei, October 2000 / 747-400
Spanair 5022
Madrid, August 2008 / MD-82
Surprise:  Ram Air Turbine probe heat is on
and its temperature is increasing.
Response (Capt):  Reset breaker several 
times; after 30 minutes saw that MEL said
“the airplane could be dispatched with the
probe heating inoperative as long as icing
conditions were not forecast for the flight”;    
so, disconnect power to RAT probe and 
depart.
Full airplane sitting on the runway on a hot 
day in August.
Flash Air 604
Sharm el-Sheikh, January 2004
Surprise 1 (with a Startle):  Due to force on
the column, the autopilot does not engage in 
the expected mode; the FD roll bar is lost.
Response (Capt):  A shocked exclamation; 
distraction.
Surprise 2:  The distracted Captain continues 
to make roll inputs to the right, ending up at 
20º right instead of 20º left. 
Response (Capt):
FO: Turning right, sir
Captain: What?
FO: Aircraft turning right
Captain: Turning right? How turning right?
The airplane eventually rolled to about 110° to 
the right before substantial control inputs in the 
opposite direction were made, which was too 
late to avoid the crash into the Red Sea.
Sub-threshold Roll
SD in Commercial Aviation
SD is a Likely Contributor to a Significant Percentage of LOC Events
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Autoflight Surprises (aka Mode Confusion)
16 Incidents and 26 Accidents
v The autopilot is off or failed, and the pilot thought it was engaged
§ Eastern L1011, near Miami, 1972; an inadvertent touch of the control column disengaged the A/P, and the 
airplane started a gradual, undetected descent into the ground
v The autopilot goes into an alternate control law and the autoflight behavior is changed
§ Air Asia A320, Indonesia, 2014; due to pilot actions, drop into Alternate Law mode.  Unlike in normal operations, 
the airplane can stall in Alternate Law, and inappropriate pilot actions led to a stall.
v The autopilot takes actions that the pilot is not aware of
§ Aeroflot Nord 737, Perm, Russia, 2008; thrust levers were mis-calibrated but A/P was engaged and managing 
thrust.  Pilot was unaware of A/P actions. When A/P was disengaged, pilot failed to handle thrust difference. 
v The autopilot (or autothrottle) mode reverts to another mode
§ Flash Air 737, Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, 2004; pilot engaged A/P but it engaged in control wheel steering (CWS-R) 
mode, and FD roll bar disappeared.  Pilot exclaims from surprise by this reversion.  
v The pilot does not understand the mode’s behavior
§ Asiana 777, San Francisco, 2013; on approach, pilot selected FLCH mode for descent, and the airplane started 
climbing to the MCP altitude.
v The pilot failed to put the airplane into the correct mode or autoflight state
§ Air Inter A320, near Strasbourg France, 1992; on approach, the crew intended to program the autopilot for a 3.3-
degree flight path, but inadvertently selected vertical speed mode (resulting in 3300 ft/min descent).  
Barriers to Understanding
(and some proposals to remove the barriers)
v System interface
§ single-sensor, single indicator
§ autoflight: hidden rules, states, targets, and more
v Operational procedures
§ no accommodation for knowledge-based performance
§ not oriented to operational decisions
v Operator training
§ equipment-oriented
§ a reluctance to dissect expertise (“airmanship”)
Single-sensor; single-indicator architecture
There is a burden on the operator to
- allocate attention appropriately
- add context
- understand system state
- identify developing problems
Airplane Interface Started the Same Way
Primary Indications
Secondary Indications
Important engine states must be inferred
- engine surge
- engine damage / severe engine damage
- significant degradation or vibration
There have been cases of confusion about
which engine is affected
The Regulations require all of these parameters
The Airplane Interface has some Vestiges of SS-SI
Engine Indications
Centralized alerting
Basic Thrust
Parameter
Engine
Indication
Deviation that
caused the
condition is revealed
Sikora, J. & Mumaw, R. (2004). Making engine displays more 
meaningful to flight crews. Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Human-Computer Interaction in Aeronautics, 
Toulouse, France.
• Operating State (Engine Availability)
- engine running
- engine not running 
- failed 
- shut down
- engine starting (and status)
• Non-Normal State
- which engine is affected?
- what is the required action?
- reduce throttle
- shut down engine
- why?  what condition is present?
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On climb in VNAV/LNAV, 
the airplane was leveled at 
FL150 for traffic. The 
airplane is now cleared to 
FL310. MCP is dialed up to 
31000. However, when in 
VNAV ALT vertical mode, 
the pilot must push on the 
altitude knob to start 
climbing.
Autoflight Interface
Scattered Indicators and Hidden Rules
Target confusion
Multi-function buttons
Hidden VNAV behaviors
Early descent zone
v Problem: Reactor coolant leak in an unusual place (distributed symptoms);               
Solution requires a transition between separate Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)
v Key EOP step:  if Steam Generator (SG) pressure NOT stable or increasing return to step 1   
[and, SG pressure is decreasing]
v Key to solving:
§ A focus on other inputs to SG pressure (use of schematics)
§ Understood that the point of the step was to determine if the SG was faulted
§ Awareness that they were stuck in a procedural loop
Roth, E.M., Mumaw, R.J., & Lewis, P.M.  (1994).  An empirical investigation of operator 
performance in cognitively demanding simulated emergencies.  (NUREG/CR-6208).  
Washington, DC:  Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Procedure Use for a Cognitively Demanding Fault
Solving the Problem
The Struggle between Understanding and Following Procedures
Compliance >> Solving the Problem
v Nuclear power plant operators in a training exercise
§ They understand the limitations of the procedure
§ They understand that they are not addressing the problem
Malicious Procedural Compliance
Qantas A380 Uncontained Engine Failure
§QF 32;  Singapore to Sydney; 469 people 
on board
§ 4 minutes after Take-off, engine no. 2 
bursts, severely damaging other equipment
§ 43 ECAM messages in first 60 seconds; 
many additional later (> 80 total)
§ 50 minutes to sort through the non-normal 
checklists (NNCs)
“It was hard to work out a list of 
what had failed; it was getting to 
be too much to follow.  So we 
inverted our logic: Instead of 
worrying about what failed, I 
said ‘Let’s look at what’s 
working.’”       A380 Captain
Explosion of Alert Messages
Managing Non-Normals
2:01:08ENG 2 TURBINE OVERHEAT
2:01:09ENG 2 STALL
ENG 2 OIL TEMP HI
ENG 2 EGT OVER LIMIT
2:01:13F/CTL SLAT SYS 1+2 FAULT
HYD G RSVR PRESS LO
HYD Y ENG 4 PMP A PRESS LO
HYD Y ENG 4 PMP B PRESS LO
L/G CTL 1 FAULT
AIR L OUTR WING LEAK
AIR L INR WING LEAK
AIR ENG 2 BLEED LEAK
2:01:14F/CTL PART SPLRS FAULT
F/CTL ALTN LAW (PROT LOST)
L/G CTL 2 FAULT
BRAKES A-SKID FAULT ON WING LG
2:01:15ELEC DRIVE 1 DISCONNECTED
F/CTL AILERON ACUATOR FAULT
F/CTL AILERON ELEC ACTUATOR FAULT
HYD G RSVR LEVEL LO
2:01:16ELEC C/B TRIPPED
ELEC DRIVE 2 DISCONNECTED
2:01:17F/CTL L MID AILERON FAULT
2:01:18ELEC AC BUS 2 FAULT
ENG 2 NORM MODE FAULT
2:01:23A-ICE WING VLV OPEN
A-ICE ENG 1 VLV OPEN
A-ICE ENG 2 VLV OPEN
2:01:24AIR L OUTR WING LEAK
AIR L INR WING LEAK
AIR ENG 2 BLEED LEAK
2:01:25FUEL JETTISON VLV NOT CLOSED
ENG 1 NORM+ALTN MODE FAULT
ENG 2 NORM+ALTN MODE FAULT
ENG 4 NORM+ALTN MODE FAULT
2:01:28F/CTL AILERON ACTUATOR FAULT
2:02:18ENG 2 TURBINE OVERHEAT
ENG 2 OIL PRESSURE LOW
2:02:41ENG 2 FIRE
2:03:00ishENG 2 FAIL (flight crew shut it down)
2:03:30ishVENT COOLG SYS OVHT
2:06:29ENG 2 SHUTDOWN
2:06:40AUTO FLT A/THR OFF
2:06:45ishF/CTL SLAT SYS 1+2 FAULT
2:07:19HYD G RSVR LEVEL LO
2:07:40ishHYD G RSVR AIR PRESS LO
2:11:30ishHYD G SYS PRESS LO
2:12:45ishHYD Y ENG PMP A PRESS LO
HYD Y ENG PMP B PRESS LO
2:16:20ELEC AC BUS 2 FAULT
2:16:29FUEL JETTISON VLV NOT CLOSED
2:16:45ENG 1 NORM+ALTN MODE FAULT
ENG 2 NORM+ALTN MODE FAULT
ENG 4 NORM+ALTN MODE FAULT
2:16:50ishLOW OIL QUANTITY ENG 2
2:18:43AIR L INR WING LEAK
AIR L OUTR WING LEAK
AIR ENG 2 BLEED LEAK
2:19:33FUEL NORM+ALTN MODE FAULT
2:21:50ishFUEL FEED TK2 MAIN+STBY PMPS FAULT
FUEL NORM+ALTN XFR FAULT
FUEL JETTISON VLV NOT CLOSED
2:21:56F/CTL PART SPLRS FAULT
2:22:06ELEC AC BUS 2 FAULT
2:22:30ishFUEL JETTISON VLV NOT CLOSED
2:22:42FUEL NORM+ALTN XFR FAULT
2:29:00ishFUEL L INR TK FWD+AFT PMPS FAULT
FUEL R INR TK FWD+AFT PMPS FAULT
2:31:07F/CTL ALTN LAW (PROT LOST)
2:31:35LOW OIL QUANTITY ENG 2
2:31:46FUEL FEED TK 2 MAIN+STBY PMPS FAULT
2:33:08LOW OIL QUANTITY ENG 2
2:33:18A-ICE ENG VLV 1 OPEN
2:33:22FUEL WINGS NOT BALANCED
FUEL L INR TK FWD+AFT PMPS FAULT
FUEL R INR TK FWD+AFT PMPS FAULT
2:34:18LOW OIL QUANTITY ENG 2
2:34:46ELEC C/B TRIPPED
2:35:01F/CTL L OUTR AILERON FAULT
F/CTL R OUTR AILERON FAULT
F/CTL L MID AILERON FAULT
F/CTL AILERON ACTUATOR FAULT
2:35:51LOW OIL QUANTITY ENG 2
2:36:10L/G CTL 2 FAULT
2:36:26COND FWD CARGO VENT FAULT
2:37:20A-ICE WING VLV OPEN
86 ECAM messages (over 36 minutes)
Qantas 32 (QF 32) Uncontained Engine Failure
The crew later reported that they
had begun to understand the effect
of the engine failure on the aircraft
and its systems. (after 1 hr 10 min)
Diversion
Decision
Making
Airplane
system
failure
Mumaw, R.J., Feary, M., Fucke, L., Stewart, M., Ritprasert, R., Popovici, A., & 
Deshmukh, R.  (2018).  Managing complex airplane system failures through a 
structured assessment of airplane capabilities.  NASA/TM-2018-291775. Moffett Field, 
CA: NASA Ames Research Center.
Mission
Compatibility
Airplane
Capabilities
Maneuver
Envelope
Changes to
Operational Limitations
(phase of flight)
(if needed)
New Approach for Managing Non-normals
Airplane System Components
§Hydraulic system
§Thrust Reverser
§Battery
§Air conditioning pack
Airplane Capabilities
§Range / Endurance
§Stopping Distance (on runway)
§Ability to perform a specific approach
§Ability to enter RVSM airspace
§Maneuver envelope
Airplane system 
components have failed
What can I do?
Where can I go?
What is a Capability?
Standard Approach to Systems Training 
Knobology
v Training on the interface to the flight 
deck interface is typically a tour of the 
physical features.
v Operational relevance is less of a 
focus
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At this point, the flight crew is expecting a normal descent on the FMS flight path.  However, the flight 
crew is also looking ahead for potential threats to the plan, such as changes to the wind or traffic.  Also, 
the flight crew has determined that one of the flight plan legs is pretty steep, and they know it can be 
flown more easily if they cross LOZIT well below 16,000 ft (rather than simply making the restriction at 
16,000 ft). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Situation:  The airplane is held at cruise altitude past the Top of Descent point, and there is a waypoint altitude constraint that may be hard to make. 
Example:  Held in CRZ at FL310; using the BDEGA3 arrival (LEGGS transition) into SFO.  The waypoint LOZIT has an ‘at or below’ restriction at 16000. 
Situation Model Expected Values & Decision Gates Actions Display Elements 
Nearing ToD; prior to new clearance 
Flight path is programmed in the FMS; 
A/P will descend aircraft on the arrival 
as programmed. 
LOZIT to BDEGA leg is steep (known 
from experience) Should cross LOZIT below 16000 due to 
geometry of FMS flight path 
Monitor winds and update FMS 
Identify traffic that might cause a late 
descent 
Verbalize current plan and any  
inconsistencies  
Identify difficult FPM segments FMS LEGS page 
Nav display, Radio chatter 
NAV Display wind vector 
ATC requests delaying descent until 
notified 
Airplane will now go above FMS flight 
path; Eventual flown path will need to be 
steeper;  
Use 3-to-1 to determine: What is latest 
position where I can still make LOZIT at 
16000? Generate a GATE on current path at 
FL310 where it is too late to get down 
to LOZIT at 16000 
CNTRL: slow down, as possible, to 
preserve options and decrease energy 
Estimate how long you will be held high Radio Traffic 
NAV Display wind vector 
A Reluctance to Treat “Airmanship” as Trainable
Monitoring for Flight Path Management
Monitor flightcrew
resources
Monitor operational
environment / ATC
Monitor flight
parameters relative
to flight envelope
Monitor FPM targets and 
airplane configuration
Establish
FPM objective
Identify potential
threats to FPM
objective
Identify trigger
points for action
Monitor to confirm
other indications or
make sense of
unexpected
indications
Monitor feedback
from control inputs
Determine
expected
values and states
Brief
FPM objective
Communicate
need to intervene / 
Make control
inputs to meet
FPM objective
Identify real
deviations
and determine
their source Determine if
intervention is
required
(coordination
or control)
Detect
Identify relevant
indications/info
Configure interface to
facilitate monitoring Monitor airplane
indications relative
to FPM targets
Mental
Models (systems 
and devices)
Situation
Model
Operational 
Experience / 
Training Other operational tasks
Distractions / Interruptions
Mind wandering
Attention
Manager
Shift non-monitoring tasks
to less-intensive flight phases
v Operator surprises are not uncommon for jet transport pilots.  System complexity and lack of 
transparency is a major contributor.  For various reasons, re-framing can fail.
v Operators strive for system understanding; the interface, procedures, and training can create 
barriers to understanding.  Designing to support understanding runs counter to early design 
ideas.
v The interface needs to integrate information to support operational decision making.
v Procedures need to find a way to remove limitations and support knowledge-based 
performance.
v Training also needs to be more operationally oriented and find a way to expose 
expertise.
v Operator communication is another significant method for supporting understanding.
Points to Take Away
Thanks for your time!
Seattle, home of Boeing, has many airplane-savvy people.
LOOK!!  
It’s a beaver !!
????
No, Jimmy, that’s
an airplane.
Making Sense of a Complex World 
Understanding relies on each individual’s experience and knowledge
